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IN THE MATTER OF BELL PETROLEUM SERVICES, INC.:
REVIEWING REMOVAL ACTIONS UNDER THE
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS STANDARD
OF REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to growing public apprehension concerning the
adverse health and environmental effects of irresponsible waste dis-
posal, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). 1
CERCLA places the cost of environmental cleanup on the parties
responsible for disposing hazardous wastes in violation of standards
established by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 2 More
importantly, CERCLA allows the government to initiate response
measures immediately upon discovery of a release or threatened re-
lease of a hazardous substance.3 Response costs are initially paid
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980 (CERCLA), §§ 101-308, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
2. See CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607. Under CERCLA, potentially responsi-
ble parties (PRPs) include:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal .... and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities ....
Id. § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
3. CERCIA § 104(a) (1) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1) (A). CERCIA § 104 au-
thorizes the President to implement appropriate removal or remedial measures,
consistent with the National Contingency Plan, "[w]henever (A) any hazardous
substance is released or there is a substantial threat of such a release into the envi-
ronment. .. ." Id.
The term "hazardous substance" is defined under CERCLA § 101 (14) and in-
cludes any substance deemed hazardous under other various federal statutes.
CERCLA § 101 (14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14); see NewJersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection
& Energy v. Glouster Envtl. Management Serv., Inc., 821 F. Supp. 999, 1005 (D.N.J.
1993). CERCLA § 102 also delegates to the Administrator of EPA the authority to
designate additional hazardous substances. Id. Section 102 provides in part:
The Administrator shall promulgate and revise as may be appropriate,
regulations designating as hazardous substances, in addition to those re-
ferred to in section 9601(14) of this title, such elements, compounds,
mixtures, solutions, and substances which, when released into the envi-
ronment may present substantial danger to the public health or welfare
or the environment ....
CERCLA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 9602.
(133)
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from the Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund (Superfund), 4
but later may be recovered from the responsible parties. 5
Response actions under CERCLA include both short-term re-
moval actions6 and permanent remedial actions. 7 Removal actions
are intended as interim measures to be implemented in response to
an immediate threat to human health or the environment.8 In con-
trast, remedial actions are intended to effectuate permanent envi-
4. Under the original CERCLA legislation, the Hazardous Substance Re-
sponse Trust Fund was established under CERCLA § 131, 42 U.S.C. § 9631. When
Congress amended CERCLA in 1986, the trust fund was reestablished under the
Internal Revenue Code and retitled as the Hazardous Substance Superfund
(Superfund). See 26 I.R.C. § 9507 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
5. See CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607. Under CERCLA, PRPs may be held
liable for:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian Tribe not inconsistent with the na-
tional contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,
including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or
loss resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out
under section 9604(i) of this title.
Id.
6. CERCLA § 101 (23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (23). Section 101 defines removal ac-
tions as response mechanisms which are necessary for the abatement or preven-
tion of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance. Id. Appropriate
removal actions include "security fencing or other measures to limit access, provi-
sion of alternative water supplies, temporary evacuation and housing of threatened
individuals not otherwise provided for, action taken under section 9604(b) of this
title, and any emergency assistance which may be provided under the Disaster Re-
lief and Emergency Assistance Act." Id. (citations omitted).
7. CERCLA § 101 (24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). CERCLA defines a remedial ac-
tion as:
IT] hose actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in
addition to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release
of a hazardous substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize
the release of a hazardous substance so that they do not migrate to cause
substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare or the
environment.
Id.
8. CERCLA § 101 (23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (23); see also United States Steel Sup-
ply, Inc. v. Alco Standard Corp., 36 Envtl. Rep. Cases (BNA) 1330 (N.D. Ill.
1992) (holding removal actions are only appropriate in emergency situations);
Channel Master Satellite Sys. Inc. v. JFD Elec. Corp., 748 F. Supp. 373, 385
(E.D.N.C. 1990) (holding removal actions are reserved for limited situations in
which rapid action is needed to prevent or contain threat to human health or
environment); Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1577 (E.D.
Pa. 1988) (holding removal actions may be implemented only in response to exi-
gent circumstances).
[Vol. VII: p. 133
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ronmental cleanup. 9 Judicial review of both removal and remedial
actions initiated by the government is limited to the administrative
record. 10 Furthermore, response actions must be upheld unless
found to be "arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law."'"
In In Re Bell Petroleum Services,12 the Fifth Circuit addressed the
extent to which EPA removal actions are reviewable under the arbi-
trary and capricious standard.'3 Based on the evidence in the ad-
ministrative record, the court ruled that EPA's decision to construct
an alternate water supply system was arbitrary and capricious. 14
This Note examines the statutory distinction between removal and
remedial actions under CERCLA and discusses whether this distinc-
tion should have an effect on a reviewing court's analysis under the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review. 15
Section II of this Note begins with a brief summary of the facts
of Bell Petroleum. Section III presents an overview of CERCLA's leg-
islative development, and evaluates relevant judicial interpretations
effecting the authority of EPA to initiate response measures under
the Act. Also, this section examines the extent to which EPA re-
sponse action is subject to judicial review under the arbitrary and
capricious standard. Lastly, this Note outlines the distinction be-
tween removal and remedial actions and explores the significance
of this distinction in EPA initiated cost recovery actions.
9. CERCLA § 101(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24); see also County Line Inv. Co. v.
Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1512 n.6 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting remedial actions, in-
tended as permanent response measures, are distinguishable from removal actions
which are designed for more limited purposes).
10. CERCLA § 113(j)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(j)(1). This section provides:
In any judicial action under this chapter, judicial review of any issues con-
cerning the adequacy of any response action taken or ordered by the
President shall be limited to the administrative record. Otherwise appli-
cable principles of administrative law shall govern whether any supple-
mental materials may be considered by the court.
Id.
11. CERCLA § 113(j)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(j)(2). The language "otherwise
not in accordance with law" is given effect by CERCIA § 104 which requires EPA
action to be consistent with the National Contingency Plan (NCP). CERCLA
§ 104(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1).
12. 3 F.3d 889 (5th Cir. 1993).
13. Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 906. The court in Bell Petroleum also addressed
whether a non-settling tort-feasor could be held jointly and severally liable where a
reasonable method of apportionment could be demonstrated; however, this topic
will not be discussed in this Note. Id. at 908.
14. Id. at 892.
15. For a discussion of the statutory distinction between removal and reme-
dial actions, see infra notes 93-113 and accompanying text.
1996] 135
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II. FACTS
The Bell Petroleum litigation arose from a Texas Water Commis-
sion investigation into reports of discolored drinking water at a site
located near Odessa, Texas.16 This investigation centered on a
chromium-plating shop which operated continuously from 1971 to
1977.17 In 1984, EPA declared the area a Superfund site 8 and sub-
sequently entered into a cooperative agreement with the State of
Texas to begin response measures.' 9 Pursuant to the agreement,
Texas conducted a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study
(RI/FS)20 which revealed that the area's main water supply source
contained harmful levels of chromium contamination. 2'
16. Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 892.
17. Id. at 903. The Texas Water Commission's investigation revealed that the
process of chromium plating produced excess waste water which was pumped out
of the facility, and resulted in the contamination of local water supplies. Id.
Between 1971 and 1977, the chromium plating shop was managed by three
successive operators. Id. The site was originally operated by its ownerJohn Leigh.
Id. Subsequently, Leigh transferred the assets of the shop to Western Pollution
Control Corporation (Bell) who continued operating the shop under a lease with
Leigh. Id. In 1976, Bell assigned its lease and sold its assets to the Sequa Corpora-
tion which continued to operate the chromium plating shop until its demise in
late 1977. Id.
18. See CERCLA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605. A Superfund site is a contaminated
area listed on the National Priorities List (NPL). Id. NPL is a hazardous waste site
ranking system which "assesses the relative degree of risk to human health and the
environment posed by sites and facilities subject to review." Id. § 105(c)(1), 42
U.S.C. § 9605(c) (1). The purpose of NPL is to identify those sites which pose the
greatest threat to human health or the environment and to prioritize these sites
according to the need for remedial action. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.425 (1994). Cur-
rently, EPA only considers sites listed on NPL as eligible for remedial response. Id.
19. Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 892. CERCLA bases federal remedial action on
the cooperative participation of state agencies. CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604.
Section 104 provides that, "[tlhe President shall not provide any remedial actions
pursuant to this section unless the State in which the release occurs first enters
into a contract or cooperative agreement .... ." Id. § 104(c)(3), 42 U.S.C.§ 9604(c) (3); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.180(d), 300.500-.525 (1994) (providing the
corresponding regulatory guidelines to effectuate Congress' legislative mandate).
But see United States v. Gurley Ref. Co., 788 F. Supp. 1473, 1482 (E.D. Ark.
1992) (holding EPA's failure to enter into cooperative agreement with State prior
to implementing response measure did not bar subsequent cost recovery), modi-
fied, 43 F.3d 1188 (8th Cir. 1994).
20. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a) (2) (1994). The purpose of a Remedial Investi-
gation and Feasibility Study (RI/FS) is to evaluate the extent of environmental
damage and to develop appropriate remedial measures. Id. "Developing and con-
ducting an RI/FS generally includes the following activities: project scoping, data
collection, risk assessment, treatability studies, and analysis of alternatives." Id.
21. Id. EPA has established a schedule of "listed hazardous substances" which
are subject to CERCLA regulation. CERCLA § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9602(a). This
list includes chromium and chromium based compounds as regulated substances.
See 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (1994). Furthermore, Congress has explicitly mandated that
high priority be given to contaminated water supplies. See CERCLA § 118, 42
U.S.C. § 9618 ("the President shall give a high priority to facilities where the re-
[Vol. VII: p. 133
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Texas subsequently conducted a "focused" feasibility study to
determine whether an alternate water supply system should be in-
stalled until final remedial measures could be implemented.22
Based on the results of this study, EPA's Regional Administrator is-
sued a Record of Decision (ROD) authorizing an extension of
Odessa's water supply system to the contaminated area.23
On review, the Fifth Circuit ruled that EPA's decision to con-
struct the alternate water supply system was arbitrary and capricious
in light of the evidence produced in the administrative record.2 4 In
particular, the court cited EPA's failure to investigate whether any-
one was actually drinking the contaminated water.25 According to
the Fifth Circuit, such information would be essential to determine
whether a removal action would "reduce any significant threat to
public health."26
III. BACKGROUND
A. CERCLA
Congress enacted CERCLA in response to several widely publi-
cized environmental catastrophes. 27 These incidents generally in-
volved abandoned hazardous waste sites for which environmental
lease of hazardous substances or pollutants or contaminants has resulted in the
closing of drinking water wells or has contaminated a principal drinking water
supply.").
22. Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 893; see also CERCLA § 101(23), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(23) (including construction of alternate water supply system in list of ap-
propriate removal actions).
23. Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 893.
24. Id. at 907. In so holding, the Fifth Circuit rejected the district court's
application of a gross misconduct standard. Id. To show that an EPA removal
action is inconsistent with NCP criteria, a defendant is only required to demon-
strate that EPA acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Id.
25. Id. at 905. The majority opinion also relied on evidence showing that the
commercial establishments most affected by the contamination were not permitted
to utilize the alternate water supply system. Id. Judge Parker, who concurred in
part and dissented in part, noted that these businesses were given an option to be
incorporated into the system if they were willing to bear their own costs. Id. at 918.
26. Id. at 905. In contrast,Judge Parker argued that EPA's decision was amply
supported by the administrative record which demonstrated that the site's chro-
mium contamination exceeded the maximum concentration limit established by
the Safe Drinking Water Act. Id. CERCLA specifically authorizes SDWA's maxi-
mum concentration levels as an appropriate standard for agency decision-making.
Id. at 916 (citing CERCLA § 121(d) (2) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d) (2) (A)).
27. H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 17-18 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.CA.N. 6119, 6120-21. The Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce commissioned a subcommittee to investigate over a dozen abandoned haz-
ardous waste sites. Id. As a result of this investigation, the subcommittee produced
a report detailing the scope and nature of the abandoned waste site problem. Id.
This report served as a catalyst for legislative intervention. Id.
1996]
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legislation, at the time, did not provide an adequate remedy.28 For
instance, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 29
provided sufficient mechanisms to clean up active hazardous waste
sites, but failed to create adequate remedies to handle dormant
waste sites.3 0 CERCLA's legislative history reflects Congress's intent
to eliminate this "inactive hazardous waste site problem."3 1
CERCLA ameliorates the deficiencies of prior environmental
legislation by authorizing response measures immediately upon dis-
covery of a release or threatened release of a hazardous sub-
stance.3 2 EPA may commence response activities by using funds
from Superfund and later recovering costs from the responsible
parties.33 Alternatively, EPA may compel responsible parties to im-
plement remedial measures on their own.34
In accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),35
CERCLA restricts litigation concerning an EPA response action to
The Love Canal incident is perhaps the most illustrious case among those
investigated by the subcommittee. Id. This incident involved the disposal of large
amounts of chemical industrial waste by the Hooker Chemical Company. Id. Resi-
dents of the Niagara Falls area were victims of increased "miscarriage and birth
defect rates." Id. Eventually, 230 families were evacuated from the area. Id.
28. Id. at 6120.
29. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), §§ 3001-5006,
42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-56 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
30. H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 27, at 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6120. The House Report outlined the major deficiencies of RCRA:
(1) The Act is prospective and applies to past sites only to the extent that
they are posing an imminent hazard. Even there, the Act is of no help if
a financially responsible owner of the site cannot be located.
(2) RCRA does not authorize EPA and the Department ofJustice to sub-
poena documents or persons suspected of illegal or inadequate hazard-
ous waste disposal practices.
(3) RCRA does not require people to reveal the existence and monitor
possible pollution from inactive waste disposal sites.
(4) RCRA provides inadequate funds for State hazardous waste
programs.
Id.
31, H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 27, at 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CA.N. at
6120.
32. CERCLA § 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a).
33. Id. § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607. For the definition of a potentially responsible
party under CERCLA, see supra note 2.
34. See CERC[A § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (pertaining to abatement actions).
35. Administrative Procedure Act (APA) §§ 551-59, 701-06, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-
59, 701-06 (1994). Under the current version of APA, the standard of review ap-
plied to agency action is provided by 5 U.S.C. § 706. This section provides:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional
and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of
the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall -
6
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review of the administrative record.3 6 In the legislative history sup-
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and con-
clusions found to be -
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case sub-
ject to sections 556 and 557 of this tide or otherwise
reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided
by statute; or
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due
account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.
5 U.S.C. § 706.
See also Roberts v. Morton, 549 F.2d 158, 160 (10th Cir. 1976) (holding that
review of agency action is limited "to the agency record or such portions of it
which the parties may cite, and additional evidence is not to be admitted."), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 1029
(10th Cir. 1976) ("[t]he grounds upon which the agency acted must be clearly dis-
closed in, and sustained by, the record."), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977); Harper
Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 284 F.2d 137, 140 (10th Cir. 1960) ("where Con-
gress has delegated primary jurisdiction in a given field to an Administrative body,
the jurisdiction of a court in reviewing its proceedings is limited to determining
whether there is in the record substantial evidence to support its findings and
conclusions.").
Warren County v. North Carolina, 528 F. Supp. 276, 288 (E.D.N.C.
1981) ("Uj]udicial review of any agency action is to be confined to the record on
which the decision was made."); Littell v. Morton, 369 F. Supp. 411, 423 n.13 (D.
Md. 1974) ("[r]eview of administrative decisions is limited to the record with no de
novo review."), aff'd, 519 F.2d 1399 (4th Cir. 1975); South Dakota v. Volpe, 353 F.
Supp. 335, 338 (D.S.D. 1973)("[i]t is a well recognized rule of law that judicial
review of an administrative decision is limited in scope. Such a review is confined
to a review of the record made at the administrative level."); Wheatley v. W.D.
Shields, 292 F. Supp. 608, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (noting that "parties correctly agree
that this Court is limited in its review to the record of the administrative
proceedings.").
36. CERCLA § 113(j), 42 U.S.C. § 96130). This section provides, in part, that
'Judicial review of any issues concerning the adequacy of any response action taken
or ordered by the President shall be limited to the administrative record." Id. In
City of Waltham v. United States Postal Service, 786 F. Supp. 105, 116 (D. Mass.
1992), aff'd, 11 F.3d 235 (1st Cir. 1993), the District Court of Massachusetts de-
scribed the administrative record as "the record that was before the agency at the
time it made the decision in issue." (citations omitted). The court further com-
mented that "[t ] his record 'consists of all documents and materials directly or indi-
rectly considered by agency decision-makers.'" Id. (citing Towns of Norfolk &
Walpole v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 137 F.R.D. 183, 185 (D. Mass.
1991)).
Courts have recognized a narrow exception to APA's requirement that a re-
viewing court's analysis be restricted to the administrative record. This exception
generally arises when the agency fails to compile an administrative record suffi-
cient for the purpose of review. See Asarco, Inc. v. EPA, 616 F.2d 1153, 1160 (9th
Cir. 1980) (permitting reviewing court to consider evidence outside the administra-
tive record "for background information.., or for the limited purposes of ascer-
taining whether the agency considered all relevant factors or fully explicated its
course of conduct or grounds of decision."); United States v. Wastecontrol of Fla.,
Inc., 730 F. Supp. 401, 405 (M.D. Fla. 1989) ("If the defendant finds the record
1996]
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plementing the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
of 1986 (SARA), s7 Congress expressed two policy reasons for this
restriction. First, by limiting review to the administrative record,
Congress ensures that the bases for EPA decisions are continuously
available for public scrutiny.38 Second, by excluding extraneous in-
formation, reviewing courts are able to operate more efficiently.3 9
CERCLA also provides that response costs are recoverable only
to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the National Con-
tingency Plan (NCP). 40 The NCP embodies EPA's regulatory
scheme for investigating hazardous waste sites and developing sub-
sequent response actions.41 In actions initiated by EPA, the defend-
ant bears the burden of proving that response actions are
inconsistent with NCP requirements. 42 To meet this burden the de-
inadequate or believes that further information must be disclosed, the defendant
may file a motion requesting that the Court supplement the administrative record
or permit discovery on a narrow issue.").
The exception is further supported by decisions under APA. See Public Power
Council v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 791, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1982) (commenting that
"[w] hen there is 'such a failure to explain administrative action as to frustrate ef-
fective judicial review,' the court may 'obtain from the agency, either through affi-
davits or testimony, such additional explanations of the reasons for the agency
decision as may prove necessary.' ") (citing Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143
(1973)); National Treasury Employees Union v. Hove, 840 F. Supp. 165, 168
(D.D.C. 1994) (ruling that a "court may consider evidence outside the administra-
tive record ... as a means of requiring an agency to explicate its own reasoning
when the record is unclear."), aff'd sub noa, National Treasury Employees Union v.
Helfer, 53 F.3d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1995); City of Reading v. Austin, 816 F. Supp. 351,
361 (E.D. Pa. 1993)("[olne exception to the general rule permits a court to go
outside of the record to consider background evidence clarifying the information
before the agency at the time of decision.") (citations omitted); Waltham, 786 F.
Supp. at 117 (D. Mass. 1992) (ruling that a court may consider external evidence
" 'tending to show significant impacts or realistic alternatives that the responsible
officials ignored.' ")(citations omitted).
37. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), Pub.L.No. 99-
499, 100 Star. 1613 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
38. H.R. REP. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.CA.N. 2835, 2921.
39. Id. at 2921.
40. CERCLA § 107(d) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d) (1).
41. See 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1994); Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 894.
42. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., (NEPACCO),
810 F.2d 726, 747 (8th Cir. 1986); see also United States v. R-W. Meyer, Inc., 889
F.2d 1497, 1508 (6th Cir. 1989) (ruling that defendant in goverment initiated re-
sponse action "bears the burden of demonstrating that the costs sought under
CERCLA's liability provisions are inconsistent with the NCP."), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1057 (1990). Conversely, in actions brought by private parties to recover response
costs, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that response measures con-
form to NCP criteria. NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 747.
8
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fendant must show that EPA acted arbitrarily or capriciously in im-
plementing a response measure. 43
B. The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard of Review
Judicial review of agency action is guided by a two-pronged
analysis. 44 A reviewing court must first determine whether explicit
statutory language precludes agency discretion.45 If Congress has
directly spoken to the issue, agency action must comply with Con-
gress's legislative scheme.46 Conversely, if Congress fails to address
a particular issue, a reviewing court's analysis shifts to whether the
agency's decision is "based on a permissible construction of the stat-
ute."47 In the absence of clear legislative guidance, a court must
give effect to an agency's reasonable interpretation of Congress's
legislative intent.48
43. CERCLA § 1130)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 96130)(2); see Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983). In State Farm, the Supreme Court offered the following commentary on
the application of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review:
Normally an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency
has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, en-
tirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in
view or the product of agency expertise.
Id. at 43. Other federal court decisions have offered similar descriptions of the
arbitrary and capricious standard. See Board of County Comm'rs of County of Ad-
ams v. Isaac, 18 F.3d 1492, 1497 (10th Cir. 1994) ("[a] n agency acted arbitrarily
and capriciously if it relied on factors deemed irrelevant by Congress, failed to
consider important aspects of the problem, presented an implausible explanation
or one contrary to the evidence."); Mount Evans Co. v. Madigan, 14 F.3d 1444,
1453 (10th Cir. 1994) (ruling that judicial review under arbitrary and capricious
standard is narrow and that agency's decision will be upheld if it was reasonable in
light of a fair consideration of the relevant factors).
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy, 610 F.2d 796, 801 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1979) (ruling that the appropriate inquiry under the arbitrary and capricious
standard of review is whether the agency's" 'decision was based on a consideration
of the relevant factors, whether there has been a clear error of judgment and
whether there is a rational basis for the conclusions approved by the administrative
body.' ") (quoting Texaco, Inc. v. FEA, 531 F.2d 1071, 1076-77 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937 (1980)).
44. Chevron, U.SA., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984); United States v. ILCO, Inc., 996 F.2d 1126, 1130 (11th Cir.
1993) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45).
45. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842; see also ILCO, 996 F.2d at 1130 ("If Congress has
clearly and directly spoken to the precise question at issue, effect must be given to
the expressed intent of Congress.") (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45).
46. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842; ILCO, 996 F.2d at 1130.
47. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; ILCO, 996 F.2d at 1130; Western Oil & Gas Ass'n
v. EPA, 767 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying Chevron criteria to EPA interpreta-
tion of Clean Air Act (CAA)).
48. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; ILCO, 996 F.2d at 1130.
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In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
the United States Supreme Court approved EPA's construction of
an ambiguous provision of the Clean Air Act (CAA).49 CAA di-
rected EPA to establish regulations requiring states to adopt a per-
mitting program for" 'new or modified major stationary sources' of
air pollution."50 Under the promulgated regulations, EPA allowed
industrial plants to qualify several pollution emitting devices within
a single "bubble."51 The issue before the Court was whether this
construction was a permissible interpretation of the term "station-
ary source."52
In reversing the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, the Supreme Court noted that neither CAA nor its legisla-
tive history offered a clear definition of the term "stationary
source."55 In circumstances where legislative guidance is ambigu-
ous, the Court held that a reviewing court must afford considerable
discretion to an agency's reasonable interpretation of the statute. 54
The Court commented that where Congress's legislative framework
leaves gaps to be filled by agency regulations, such regulations
should be upheld unless found to be "arbitrary, capricious, or mani-
festly contrary to the statute."55 Based on this analysis, the Court
ruled that EPA's "bubble" scheme was consistent with a permissible
interpretation of CAA.56
The United States Supreme Court concluded differently in Mo-
tor Vehicle Manuacturers Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.57 In State Farm, the Court evaluated
49. Clean Air Act (CAA) §§ 101-618, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7 401-7671q (1994). Chev-
ron, 467 U.S. at 841-42.
50. Id. at 840.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 842. Commenting on the Court of Appeals decision, the Court re-
marked, "The basic legal error of the Court of Appeals was to adopt a static judicial
definition of the term 'stationary source' when it had decided that Congress itself
had not commanded that definition." Id.
54. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; ILCO, 996 F.2d at 1126. In ILCO, the Eleventh
Circuit addressed the issue of "whether lead parts, which have been reclaimed
from spent car and truck batteries for recycling purposes, are exempt from regula-
tion under RCRA." Id. at 1130. Because the term "hazardous wastes" could be
reasonably interpreted to include materials collected for recycling purposes, the
Eleventh Circuit found that EPA's decision to regulate reclaimed battery parts was
based on a permissible construction of RCRA. Id. at 1132. To support its decision
the court commented, "We have found nothing in the language of the statute, and
ILCO has brought forth nothing from the legislative history to show that EPA's
policy choice is not one Congress would have sanctioned." Id.
55. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (footnote omitted).
56. Id. at 866.
57. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
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the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966
(NTMVSA) which required the Secretary of Transportation to issue
regulations which would improve traffic safety and reduce accident
fatalities.5 8 Under the Act, all actions taken by the Secretary were to
be reviewed in accordance with APA.59
The central issue in State Farm was whether the Secretary's re-
peal of a regulation requiring passive restraint systems to be imple-
mented in all automobiles manufactured after September 1982, was
arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of APA.60 The Court
acknowledged that the "'arbitrary and capricious' standard is nar-
row and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency."61 The Court, however, stressed that agency decision-mak-
ing is not completely unrestrained and that an agency must provide
a substantial basis for its decision. 62
Since the analyses conducted by the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA) provided an inadequate founda-
tion for rescinding the passive restraint system requirement,63 the
Supreme Court held that the Agency's decision was arbitrary and
capricious. 64 In so holding, the Court did not question NHTSA's
broad discretionary powers to determine appropriate traffic safety
regulations, but challenged the agency's disregard of its administra-
58. Id. at 33 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1381).
59. Id. at 33-34 (citations omitted). For a discussion of APA, see supra note 35
and accompanying text.
60. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 46-58. Under authority delegated by the Secretary
of Transportation, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
promulgated Modified Standard 208 in 1977. Id. at 37. This standard required
automobile manufacturers to incorporate passive restraint systems (automatic
seatbelts or airbags) into the design of automobiles produced after September
1982. Id. NHTSA initially anticipated that 60% of newly manufactured
automobiles would be equipped with airbags and the remaining 40% with auto-
matic seatbelts. Id. at 38. NHTSA subsequently discovered that the automobile
industry intended to produce 99% of all automobiles with automatic seatbelts. Id.
Because the detachability of automatic seatbelts counteracted any potential traffic
safety benefits, NHTSA determined that the objectives of Modified Standard 208
could not be achieved and therefore should be repealed. Id. at 38-39.
61. Id. at 43; see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 416 (1971) (Court commented, in its discussion of the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard of review that, "[a] Ithough this inquiry into the facts is to be search-
ing and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one.").
62. StateFarm, 463 U.S. at 43 ("the agency must examine the relevant data and
articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made.' ")(quoting Burlington Truck
Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
63. Id. at 46-50.
64. Id. at 46.
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tive duties.65 By failing to supply a "reasoned analysis" for its deci-
sion, NHTSA disregarded APA guidelines and violated specific
mandates of NTMVSA.66
C. The Cost Effectiveness Issue
The paradigm case concerning EPA cost recovery under CER-
CLA is United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co.
(NEPACCO).67 In NEPACCO, the appellant's production of a chemi-
cal disinfectant created various waste byproducts. 68 A portion of
the byproducts was stored in fifty-five gallon drums which were later
transported to a local farm and deposited in an underground
trench.69 Acting on an anonymous tip, EPA investigated the farm
and discovered " 'alarmingly' high concentrations of dioxin, TCP
and toluene. '' 70 EPA initially implemented a temporary removal
measure by placing a cap over the trench to prevent contamination
of the surrounding soil and groundwater. 71 Later, EPA conducted
a second removal action, extracting the fifty-five gallon drums from
the trench and placing the disinterred wastes in a specially
designed concrete bunker. 72
On appeal, the defendants challenged the district court's hold-
ing that "all costs that are not inconsistent with the NCP are conclu-
sively presumed to be reasonable."73 In rejecting the defendant's
argument, the Eighth Circuit explained that because "CERCLA
does not refer to 'all reasonable costs' but simply to 'all costs,' "
65. Id. at 48. The Court criticized NHTSA's failure to properly consider adop-
tion of an airbags-only option. The Court commented, " '[T] here are no findings
and no analysis here to justify the choice made, no indication of the basis on which
the [agency] exercised its expert discretion.' " Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines,
371 U.S. at 167).
66. Id. at 57.
67. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
68. Id. at 729-30.
69. Id. at 730. NEPACCO disposed of wastes in two manners. Most waste
materials were temporarily stored in holding tanks and subsequently disposed of
by professional waste haulers. Id. Alternatively, the wastes were stored in 55 gallon
drums which were later placed in trenches on a nearby farm. NEPACCO addressed
only the latter method of disposal. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 730. While the Eighth Circuit does not specifically
characterize EPA's response as a removal action, the court noted that "no plan for
permanent disposal has been developed, and the site will continue to require test-
ing and monitoring in the future." Id.
73. Id. at 747.
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EPA's response costs are subject to a presumption of validity.74 The
court conceded, however, that the appropriateness of response
costs is closely linked to whether EPA's selection of a particular re-
sponse measure is consistent with NCP criteria. 75 If EPA had acted
arbitrarily or capriciously in proceeding with the removal efforts at
the NEPACCO site, cost recovery would have been denied.76
In United States v. R W Meyer,77 the Sixth Circuit ruled that
EPA's failure to conduct competitive bidding prior to implement-
74. Id. at 748 (emphasis omitted). The defendants also questioned the dis-
trict court's allocation of the burden of proof. Id. at 747. Due to EPA's responsi-
bility to assemble sufficient information to justify a response action, the defendants
argued that EPA must establish compliance with NCP criteria. Id. To wit, "Appel-
lants note that the information and facts necessary to establish consistency with the
NCP are matters within the possession of the government." See also William J.
Friedman, Judicial Review Under the Superfund Amendments: Will Parties Have Meaning-
ful Input to the Remedy Selection Process, 14 COLuM. J. ENvTL. L. 187, 191 (arguing
that since the administrative record is largely composed of documents submitted
by the Agency, EPA is able to control materials available for review).
The Eighth Circuit, however, rejected this argument holding that the plain
language of CERCLA manifests an intent to place the burden of proof on defend-
ants to demonstrate inconsistency with NCP. NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 747. To sup-
port its holding, the Eighth Circuit relied on a statutory distinction between cost
recovery actions brought by the government and actions brought by private par-
ties. Id. The court noted that CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (A) allows the government to
"recover 'all costs of removal or remedial action . . . not inconsistent with the
[NCP].' " Id. (quoting CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (A)).
In contrast, CERC[A § 107(a)(4)(B) permits private parties to recover "any
other necessary costs of response ... consistent with the [NCP]." NEPACCO, 810
F.2d at 747 (quoting CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (A)). Based
on this distinction, the court concluded that Congress intended to allocate the
burden of proof more favorably to the plaintiff in government initiated actions,
and more favorably to defendants in actions brought by private parties. Id.
See also United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 899 (E.D.N.C. 1985). In
Ward, the District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina found that CER-
CLA's separate treatment of government and private party claims "implies that
government actions... are presumed to be consistent with the NCP unless other-
wise shown, while actions of private parties are not entitled to the benefit of this
presumption." Id.
75. NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 748. The Eighth Circuit noted that in establishing
NCP, EPA was directed by Congress to incorporate the " 'national hazardous sub-
stance response plan,' "which included provisions relating to the cost effectiveness
of remedial actions. Id. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit determined that under
NCP, "[clonsideration of whether particular action is 'necessary' is . . . factored
into the 'cost- effective' equation." Id. In other words, NCP regulations governing
the choice of a particular response measure implicitly anticipate the cost-effective-
ness issue. Id.
76. Id. (citing United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 900 (E.D.N.C. 1985));
see also United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d 1436, 1442 (10th Cir. 1992) (applying
arbitrary and capricious standard of review to EPA removal action), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 300 (1993); United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 729 F. Supp. 1250
(E.D. Mo. 1990).
77. 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990).
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ing a removal action was not arbitrary and capricious. 78 An investi-
gation of defendant's property,79 conducted by the Michigan
Department of Natural Resources, revealed that improper waste dis-
posal had caused hazardous substances to contaminate the city of
Cadillac's sewage treatment system.80 As a result, EPA concluded
that the site demanded an immediate removal measure to ensure
the safety of the surrounding communities.81
EPA subsequently brought suit to recover the costs of the re-
moval effort. The defendant challenged the recoverability of these
costs based upon EPA's failure to conduct competitive bidding in
accordance with government procurement procedures. 82 The
Sixth Circuit ruled, however, that EPA "must organize its response
efforts in accordance with the severity of the danger posed."83
Since the contaminated site posed an immediate threat to health,
the court concluded that EPA was justified in foregoing competitive
bidding.8 4
In a more recent case, United States v. Hardage,85 the Tenth Cir-
cuit specifically addressed the effect of CERCLA's cost effectiveness
requirement under section 105(a) (7).86 In Hardage, the court up-
held the district court's grant of summary judgment despite appel-
lant's argument that EPA response costs were excessive and
unreasonable.8 7 The court commented that inconsistency with
NCP is not determined by the reasonableness of costs, but by
whether EPA acted arbitrarily or capriciously in choosing a particu-
lar response measure. 8 As expressed by the court, "[t] he NCP reg-
ulates choice of response actions, not costs." 8 9
78. Id. at 1508.
79. Id. at 1498-99. The defendant owned property which was leased to
Northemaire Electroplating Company. As a result of Northernaire's manufactur-
ing activities, large quantities of toxic substances were stored on defendant's prop-
erty. Id.
80. Id. at 1499. This investigation was prompted by a report that a small child
had suffered chemical bums while playing on the property. Id. at 1498.
81. R.W Meyer, 889 F.2d at 1499.
82. Id.; see also 41 U.S.C. § 253 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
83. RW Meyer, 889 F.2d at 1508. EPA produced evidence that a response
measure was necessary within six months. Id. Ordinarily, the competitive bidding
process can take anywhere from nine to twelve months. Id.
84. Id.; see also Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 790 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Mich.
1990).
85. 982 F.2d 1436 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Advance Chem. Co. v.
United States, 114 S. Ct. 300 (1993).
86. Hardage, 982 F.2d at 1440.
87. Id. at 1444.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit rejected the appellant's argu-
ment that section 105(a) (7) of CERCLA requires NCP regulations
to guarantee the reasonableness of individual costs.9 0 To demon-
strate inconsistency with NCP requirements, the defendants must
show that EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to con-
sider cost when choosing a particular response action.91 A showing
that individual costs were excessive or unreasonable is not sufficient
to demonstrate that EPA's selection of a response measure was arbi-
trary and capricious.
92
D. The Distinction Between Removal and Remedial Actions
CERCLA distinguishes between two types of response actions
- removal actions and remedial actions. 93 Removal actions are in-
tended as temporary measures which may be implemented in re-
sponse to an immediate threat to human health or the
environment. 94 Removal actions are limited to emergency situa-
tions which require a speedy response; therefore, CERCLA does
not command, and correspondingly EPA has not promulgated, ex-
tensive procedural regulations governing the proper execution of a
removal action. 95 The scant legislative history accompanying the
90. Hardage, 982 F.2d at 1443. The court noted that only remedial actions are
required to be cost effective. Id. at 1444. CERCLA contains no reciprocal provi-
sion pertaining to removal actions. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See CERCLA § 101(23),(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23),(24).
94. Amland Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp. 784, 795
(D.N.J. 1989) ("Removal actions are to be taken in response to an immediate threat
to the public welfare or to the environment."); City of New York v. Exxon Corp.,
633 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("In short, 'removal' actions are primarily
those intended for the short-term abatement of toxic waste hazards.").
95. See Versatile Metals v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1577 (E.D. Pa.
1988). In Versatile Metals, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
noted that "[r]emoval actions are not subject to the lengthy procedural require-
ments of the NCP since they are taken in response to an immediate threat." Id.
Therefore, the NCP does not require EPA to conduct a full RI/FS before imple-
menting a removal action. Id.; see also Channel Master Satellite, 748 F. Supp. at 386
("Depending on urgency of response (emphasis omitted), removal actions may be
taken without preparation of [an RI/FS.]")(citing EPA Guidance Document for
Cleanup Surface Impoundment Sites).
Nevertheless, the NCP does require EPA to conduct a preliminary removal site
evaluation of the contaminated area to determine the exigency of the potential
threat. 40 C.F.R. § 300.415 (1994). Factors to consider in determining an appro-
priate removal action include in part:
(i) Actual or potential exposure to nearby human populations, animals,
or the food chain from hazardous substances or pollutants or
contaminants;
(ii) Actual or potential contamination of drinking water supplies or sen-
sitive ecosystems;
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Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA)
indicates that Congress intended, through the limited circum-
stances in which removal actions may be implemented, to leave the
manner in which removal actions are administered to EPA's
discretion. 96
Conversely, remedial actions are intended to achieve perma-
nent environmental cleanup.97 The purpose of a remedial action is
not merely to detain an immediate threat to human health or the
environment, but to realize complete environmental cleanup. 98
Since the scope of remedial actions is broader than removal ac-
tions, remedial actions are subject to a wider array of procedural
requirements.99 For example, to initiate a remedial action, NCP
requires EPA to qualify the contaminated site for placement on the
National Priorities List (NPL). 100 Then, EPA must conduct an RI/
(iii) Hazardous substances or pollutants or contaminants in drums, bar-
rels, tanks, or other bulk storage containers, that may pose a threat of
release;
(iv) High levels of hazardous substances or pollutants or contaminants in
soils largely at or near the surface, that may migrate;
(v) Weather conditions that may cause hazardous substances or pollu-
tants or contaminants to migrate or be released;
(vi) Threat of fire or explosion;
(vii) The availability of other appropriate federal or state response mech-
anisms to respond to the release; or
(viii) Other situations or factors that may pose threats to public health or
welfare of the United States or the environment.
Id. § 300.415(b) (2). If"[t]he release involves neither a hazardous substance, nor a
pollutant or contaminant that may present an imminent and substantial danger to
the public health or welfare of the United States," the NCP requires termination of
the removal site evaluation. Id. § 300.410(0 (3).
96. Channel Master Satellite, 748 F. Supp. at 385-86 (holding that removal ac-
tions are "designed to provide an opportunity for immediate action . . . where
there is no time to safely conduct [detailed] review due to the exigencies of the
situation.").
97. T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696, 706 (D.NJ.
1988) (" 'remedial' actions are generally considered long-term or permanent reme-
dies."); Exxon Corp., 633 F. Supp. at 614 (" 'remedial' actions are typically those
intended to restore long-term environmental quality.").
98. See County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1512 n.6 (10th Cir.
1991) (noting that remedial actions are intended to be " 'consistent with a perma-
nent remedy,' "while removal actions are designed for emergency situations). Id.;
NewYork v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1040 (2d Cir. 1985); Amland Proper-
ties Corp., 711 F. Supp. at 795; Channel Master Satellite, 748 F. Supp. at 385; Exxon
Corp., 633 F. Supp. at 614.
99. See Amland Properties Corp., 711 F. Supp. at 795 (noting that the NCP im-
poses more rigorous requirements on the implementation of remedial actions
than removal actions); Versatile Metals, 693 F. Supp. at 1576 (same).
100. 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b) (1) (1994).
[Vol. VII: p. 133
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FS to determine the extent of environmental damage and to de-
velop an appropriate remedial response. 10'
To date, no appellate court has comprehensively addressed the
distinction between removal and remedial actions under CER-
CLA;102 however, the consensus among the district courts suggests
that this distinction may have a dispositive effect on whether re-
sponse costs are recoverable.10 3 For example, in Versatile Metals, Inc.
v. Union Corp.,104 the District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania held that removal actions may be implemented only under
exigent circumstances and that all other response measures must
meet the stringent statutory and regulatory requirements pertain-
ing to remedial actions.1 05
In Versatile Metals, the plaintiff alleged that six months after en-
tering a lease agreement with the defendant, evidence of toxic con-
tamination was discovered on the leased property.106 After
notification of the site's contamination, the defendant initiated a
private party response action in cooperation with EPA. 10 7 In re-
sponse to the plaintiff's suit for breach of contractual warranties,
the defendant counterclaimed seeking to recover all response costs
101. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a) (2).
102. See Tinney, 933 F.2d at 1512 n.6. In Tinney, the Tenth Circuit offered a
cursory analysis of the remedial/removal action distinction. Id. The court noted
that a remedial action is intended to effectuate permanent environmental
cleanup, whereas a removal action is designed as an "interim response to particu-
lar site conditions that is governed by more limited and flexible NCP require-
ments." Id.; Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1040 (noting that CERCLA distinguishes
between two types of response measures: "remedial actions - generally long-term or
permanent containment or disposal programs - and removal efforts - typically
short-term cleanup arrangements.").
103. See Amland, 711 F. Supp. at 795. In Amland, the District Court of New
Jersey commented that "[t]he distinction between these actions is of no small im-
portance, for whereas removal actions need only comply with the relatively simple
NCP requirements set forth at 40 C.F.R. § 300.65 .... remedial actions must com-
port with the 'more detailed procedural and substantive provisions of the NCP' as
set forth at 40 C.F.R. § 300.68." Id.; Versatile Metals, 693 F. Supp. at 1576 ("The
distinction between remedial and removal actions is crucial in certain cases where
the failure to fulfill the more detailed procedural and substantive provisions of the
NCP with regard to 'remedial' actions becomes a barrier to recovery of response
costs.").
See also Colburn T. Cherney, et al., The Removal Remedial Action Conundrum for
Recovery of Private Party Response Costs Under CERCLA, 26 Chem Waste Litig. Rep.
724, 727 (1993) (outlining several district court decisions addressing the remedial/
removal action distinction).
104. 693 F. Supp. 1563 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
105. Id. at 1577.
106. Id. at 1567.
107. Id. at 1571.
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associated with the cleanup of contamination caused during the
plaintiff's occupancy of the property.10 8
Since removal actions are held to a more lenient set of proce-
dural requirements than remedial actions, 0 9 the defendant at-
tempted to characterize its response efforts as a removal action.110
The district court, however, rejected this argument and held that
removal actions are only appropriate in circumstances involving an
immediate threat to human health or the environment. 1 "Re-
moval actions are short-term, immediate response actions, and are
limited to situations which pass the 'threshold' for removal actions
.... 2 In the absence of an immediate threat, any response ac-
tion taken must conform to the rigid regulatory scheme applicable
to remedial actions. 113
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Bell Petroleum, the Fifth Circuit addressed whether an EPA
decision to implement an alternate water supply system was arbi-
trary and capricious.1 14 EPA argued that even unreasonable or ex-
cessive removal costs are recoverable under CERCLA if the
implemented action is not otherwise inconsistent with NCP 1 1 5
This argument was based on a statutory distinction between re-
moval and remedial actions under CERCLA. According to CER-
108. Id. at 1570.
109. Compare 40 C.F.R. § 300.410-.415 with 40 C.F.R. § 300.420-.435.
110. Versatile Metals, 693 F. Supp. at 1577. Note that in private party actions,
the claimant bears the burden of proving consistency with the NCP. CERCLA
§ 107(a) (4) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B).
111. Id. See Cherney et al., supra note 104, at 727 ("[T]he primary basis for
the different treatment of removal and remedial action is the need for speedy
action and flexibility to respond to imminent dangers."); United States Steel Sup-
ply, Inc., v. Alco Standard Corp., 36 ENvL. REP. CASES (BNA) 1330 (N.D. Ill
1992) (citing Tinney, 993 F.2d at 1512 n.6, for the proposition that removal actions
are only appropriate in emergency situations).
112. Versatile Metals, 693 F. Supp. at 1577.
113. Id.; see Channel Master Satellite, 748 F. Supp. at 385 ("The courts have con-
sistently found that the removal category was to be used in that limited set of cir-
cumstances involving a need for rapid action, while non-urgent situations are to be
addressed as remedial actions.").
114. Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 904.
115. Id. at 906.
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CLA section 121(b), remedial actions are to be cost effective; 116
however, no such requirement is imposed on removal actions.' 1 7
Relying on this distinction, the district court ruled that removal
costs could be recovered "so long as they were not the product of
'gross misconduct' by the agency."118 The Fifth Circuit rejected this
conclusion, finding no statutory basis for a "gross misconduct" stan-
dard. 119 The court ruled that the relevant inquiry is whether EPA
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in implementing a particular re-
sponse measure. 120
Since the administrative record provided insufficient evidence
supporting EPA's decision to construct the alternate water supply
system, the Fifth Circuit concluded that EPA's decision was arbi-
trary and capricious. 121 Although EPA surveys revealed that a
nearby aquifer contained chromium concentrations in excess of the
maximum standards established by the Safe Drinking Water Act
(SDWA),122 the court held that such evidence is not determinative
absent a showing that the contaminated water was actually being
consumed.1 23 As a result of EPA's failure to provide sufficient evi-
116. CERCLA § 121(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. §9621(b)(1). This section provides,
"The President shall select a remedial action that is protective of human health
and the environment, that is cost effective, and that utilizes permanent solutions and
alternative treatment technologies or resource recovery technologies to the maxi-
mum extent practicable." Id. (emphasis added).
117. CERCLA § 121(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b); see Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 907
n.24.
118. Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 906.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 907 (citing Hardage, 982 F.2d at 1442). The Fifth Circuit found
EPA's decision to be arbitrary and capricious based on deficiencies in the adminis-
trative record, and thus, declined to address whether unreasonable costs could be
recovered under CERCLA. Id. at 907 n.26.
121. Id. at 905.
122. 40 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (1988 & Supp. 1993) ("Each maximum con-
taminant level goal established under this subsection shall be set at the level at
which no known or anticipated adverse effects on the health of persons occur and
which allows an adequate margin of safety.").
123. Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 905 ("In vain we have searched the over five hun-
dred pages of administrative record and found not one shred of evidence that
anyone in the area was actually drinking chromium-contaminated water.").
Interestingly, CERCLA requires EPA to consider "the potential use of the sur-
face or groundwater" when applying standards established by the Clean Water Act,
but does not explicitly qualify the use of standards established by the SDWA. CER-
CIA § 121(d)(2)(B)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2) (B) (i).
In SARA's legislative history, Congress expresses a narrow construction of
CERCLA § 121, by stating:
[T] he section is not intended to trigger rigid imposition of standards that
would govern contamination levels in tap water if the water is or would
not be used for the purposes that the Safe Drinking Water [sic] Act was
enacted to safeguard .... [Rigid application of these standards would]
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dence that the alternate water supply system would significantly re-
duce any public health threat, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district
court's decision and denied EPA cost recovery. 124
In his dissenting opinion,Judge Parker argued that EPA's tech-
nical expertise should be afforded deference.1 25 Relying on the
Supreme Court's decisions in Chevron and State Farm, Judge Parker
concluded that "courts are not to second-guess the scientific judg-
ments of the EPA."' 26 The dissent further commented that "the
agency's decision need only be reasonable in light of the facts re-
flected in the administrative record and under the applicable stat-
ute (s) and regulations; it need not be the 'best' or 'most
reasonable' decision."' 27 Also, Judge Parker disagreed with the ma-
jority's cursory treatment of the SDWA's maximum concentration
limits.' 28 Since CERCLA defines a "drinking water supply" broadly,
Judge Parker argued that SDWA standards should have been given
greater weight.'2
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Bell Petroleum represents a rare
instance in which EPA response costs have been denied under the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review. Since the arbitrary and
capricious standard is to be construed narrowly and a reviewing
court may not substitute its judgment for a reasonable agency deter-
mination, most EPA response actions will be upheld by a reviewing
court.'3 0 EPA, however, is bound to comply with the substantive
lead to absurd [sic] and costly results that could drain the Fund and jeop-
ardize the national cleanup effort.
H.R. Rep. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 98 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2835, 2880.
124. Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 906.
125. Id. at 918.
126. Id: (citing Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983); Chevron, U.SA. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). For a discussion of the Chevron
and State Farm cases, see supra notes 49-66 and accompanying text.
127. Id. at 915.
128. Id. at 917.
129. Bell Petroleum 3 F.3d at 916; see CERCLA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 9601. CER-
CLA defines a drinking water supply as "any raw or finished water source that is or
may be used by a public water system (as defined in the Safe Drinking Water Act
or as drinking water by one or more individuals." (citation omitted). Id.
130. See Overton Par, 401 U.S. at 416 ("The court is not empowered to substi-
tute its judgment for that of the agency."); State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43; American
Petroleum, Inst. v. EPA, 661 F.2d 340, 348 (5th Cir. 1981).
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requirements of NCP.ls1 Consequently, EPA must compile a suffi-
cient administrative record supporting its decision to implement a
response action.13 2 A reviewing court is not obligated to rely
merely on EPA's scientific expertise. An agency entrusted with
broad regulatory powers has an affirmative duty to demonstrate on
the administrative record "why it has exercised its discretion in a
given manner."13 3
Based on the analysis above, the Fifth Circuit correctly avoided
addressing the cost-effectiveness issue raised by EPA. Since the ad-
ministrative record did not contain evidence justifying a removal
action, the issue of whether the alternate water supply was imple-
mented in a cost effective manner was moot.1 3 4 Ultimately, the
Fifth Circuit did not rely on EPA's failure to pursue cost effective
measures, but on EPA's inability to demonstrate that the contami-
nated water supply posed a potentially adverse health risk.13 5
To justify a removal action, NCP requires that the contami-
nated site pose an immediate threat to human health or the envi-
ronment.136 In government initiated actions to recover response
costs, the burden is on the defendant to show that the contami-
nated site did not pose an immediate threat;13 7 nevertheless, EPA
remains responsible for compiling a sufficient administrative rec-
ord supporting its decision. Therefore, EPA is ultimately responsi-
ble for meeting a threshold requirement to maintain its claim. 138
While Congress exempted removal actions from the stringent
procedural requirements applied to remedial actions under CER-
CLA,139 Congress did not intend to allow EPA to implement re-
131. CERCLA § 107(a) (4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (providing that the EPA
may recover response costs to the extent not inconsistent with NCP); see also
Hardage, 982 F.2d at 1442 (holding that EPA action is arbitrary and capricious only
where shown to be inconsistent with NCP).
132. See CERCLA § 1130) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0) (1) (limiting judicial review
to administrative record).
133. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 48.
134. See Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 907 n.26. The Fifth Circuit offers no opinion
on whether EPA may "recover unreasonable, unnecessary, or excessive costs." Id.
135. Id. at 906 ("on the basis of the administrative record, it appears that the
AWS did not even reduce, much less eliminate, any public health threat.").
136. See 40 C.F.R § 300.410(0 (2) (providing for termination of removal site
evaluation in absence of immediate threat of harm). For a further discussion of
removal and remedial actions, see supra notes 93-113 and accompanying text.
137. See RW Meyer, 889 F.2d at 1508; NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 747; Gurley, 788
F. Supp. at 1473.
138. See Versatile Metals, 693 F. Supp at 1577 (holding that EPA may imple-
ment a removal action only if the contaminated site meets the threshold require-
ments for a removal action).
139. See CERCLA § 121, 42 U.S.C. § 9621.
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moval actions indiscriminately. 140 Removal actions are reserved for
those limited circumstances in which a contaminated site poses an
immediate threat to human health or the environment. 141 It would
be contrary to Congressional intent to encourage ineffective re-
moval actions by allowing cost recovery where no emergency situa-
tion exists. Absent a threat to public health, EPA should
concentrate its scientific expertise and limited financial resources
on developing and implementing a permanent remedial
solution.142
VI. IMPACT
The influence of Bell Petroleum on future cost recovery litigation
in the removal action context cannot be readily ascertained. Since
defendants bear the burden of proving that EPA response actions
are inconsistent with NCP, most courts show considerable defer-
ence to EPA decision-making. 143 In the absence of proof that EPA
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in implementing a particular re-
sponse action, courts must allow cost recovery.'4 Though the arbi-
trary and capricious standard of review is firmly rooted in
established principles of administrative law, its exact contours vary
among the courts. This problem is compounded in the context of
environmental law because CERCLA limits review of EPA decisions
to the administrative record.1 45 This requirement raises a complex
issue when evidence exists to meet NCP criteria justifying a re-
140. For a discussion of the appropriate circumstances justifying a removal
action, see supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
141. See 40 C.F.R § 300.410(f) (3) (requiring termination of a removal site
evaluation in the absence of an "imminent and substantial danger to public health
or welfare of the United States.").
142. See generally CERCLA § 121, 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (expressing a Congres-
sional preference for permanent remedial measures).
143. Ward, 618 F. Supp. at 900. The District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina applied a deferential analysis to EPA response actions. Id. The
court noted that CERCLA provides liability for response costs except those incon-
sistent with NCP criteria. Id. "This language requires deference by this court to
the judgment of agency professionals." Id.; NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 748 ("Because
determining the appropriate removal and remedial action involves specialized
knowledge and expertise, the choice of a particular cleanup method is a matter
within the discretion of the EPA.").
144. NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 748. In NEPACCO, the Eighth Circuit ruled that
"'all costs' incurred by the government that are not inconsistent with the NCP are
conclusively presumed to be reasonable." Id.; see also Ward, 618 F. Supp. at 901. In
Ward, the court acknowledged the defendant's right to challenge EPA response
costs, but ruled that "defendants must show that EPA's action was arbitrary and
capricious... before the court will find such a decision to be inconsistent with the
NCP." Id.
145. CERCLA § 113(j)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(j)(1).
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sponse action but EPA fails to compile an adequate administrative
record.1 46 The Fifth Circuit's response in Bell Petroleum indicates
that failure to compile a sufficient administrative record is, in itself,
inconsistent with NCP requirements and fully justifies denial of
EPA cost recovery. 147
In most circumstances it is likely that a reviewing court will find
that EPA compiled a sufficient administrative record to support cost
recovery. In Bell Petroleum, however, the Fifth Circuit has sent a
clear message to EPA to be more selective in implementing costly
response actions. Since removal actions are intended only for
emergency situations, the Fifth Circuit held that cost recovery
should be denied where an imminent threat to human health or
the environment does not exist.148
Robert Loefflad
146. In re Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 905. Adhering strictly to CERCIA's require-
ment that review be limited to the administrative record, the Fifth Circuit strongly
asserted that "[w]e will not accept EPA's post-hoc rationalizations in justification of
its decision, nor will we attempt to supply a basis for its decision that is not sup-
ported by the administrative record." Id.
147. Id. at 907. EPA's failure to supply a sufficient administrative record in
compliance with NCP requirements rendered its decision arbitrary and capricious.
Id. "Accordingly, the EPA is not entitled to recover the costs of designing and
constructing the AWS." Id.
148. Id. at 906. "Thus, on the basis of the administrative record, it appears
that the AWS did not even reduce, much less eliminate, any public health threat.
No technical expertise is necessary to discern that the EPA's implementation of
the AWS [alternate water system] was arbitrary and capricious, as well as a waste of
money." Id. (footnote omitted).
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